Credit · Lending · RDNT
Radiant Capital is a cross-chain money market that lets users deposit on one chain and borrow on another, unifying fragmented liquidity through LayerZero.
Omnichain money market via LayerZero.
RDNT price
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Typed risks scored by severity, likelihood and impact, with the incident record behind them.
DAO wind-down under way since 1 June 2026, following the October 2024 exploit. Lending is disabled across all markets; what remains is a withdrawal-and-remediation shell.
46
severity-weighted points across 15 typed risks · 4 critical
assessed Jun 2026Market
9· 3 risks
Technological
19· 6 risks · 1 critical
Counterparty
4· 1 risk · 1 critical
Governance
13· 4 risks · 2 critical
Regulatory
1· 1 risk
Every score is recomputed at render time from the typed risks below; nothing is hand-assigned. Each risk contributes its severity weight (critical 4 · high 3 · medium 2 · low 1) to its category; the headline number is the sum across all categories. Bars scale to this entity's highest category score. Scores are not comparable across tags because a permissionless-market protocol concentrates technological risk while an institutional-credit protocol concentrates counterparty and regulatory risk, and a single league table would misrepresent both.
Market 3 × → 9
Technological 6 × → 19
Counterparty 1 × → 4
Governance 4 × → 13
Regulatory 1 × → 1
Radiant is no longer a going concern and its risk profile should be read as exit risk, not lending risk. Two exploits inside ten months, a roughly 720 ETH shortfall from a flash loan against an empty new market in January 2024 (Radiant post-mortem) and about 50 million USD from a device-malware multisig compromise in October 2024 (Radiant post-mortem), destroyed the protocol's capital base and its trust. Neither loss was recovered, and after eighteen months with no external investment and no grants the DAO began an orderly wind-down on 1 June 2026 (WuBlockchain). The dominant risks now are operational rather than financial: borrowing is disabled with caps at 1, RDNT emissions have stopped, support is best-effort, the front-end only survives through end of year, and the DAO explicitly warns that no further upgrades, patches or interventions should be assumed (Sunsetting Radiant Capital DAO). Some RIZ vault losses were declared permanently irrecoverable (RIZ post-mortem). Net posture: critical, terminal, and the only rational user action is capital withdrawal, which is exactly what the DAO itself advises.
Market3
Technological6
Counterparty1
Governance4
Regulatory1
4 documented incidents · 2 Jan 2024 to 1 Jun 2026 · how the protocol behaved under stress, with sources.
2 Jan 2024
A new native USDC market on Arbitrum launched with empty reserves; the attacker manipulated liquidityIndex through repeated flash loans combined with rounding in favour of the user on rToken burn, and borrowed 1900 WETH.
DetailsA new native USDC market on Arbitrum launched with empty reserves; the attacker manipulated liquidityIndex through repeated flash loans combined with rounding in favour of the user on rToken burn, and borrowed 1900 WETH.
Outcome: 1190 ETH was repaid initially leaving about 720 ETH short; pools were paused and markets resumed on 4 January 2024, with RFP-27 recapitalisation over about 90 days from OpEX funds and a 100,000 USD Arkham bounty.
Source16 Oct 2024
Malware compromised at least three developers' devices so the Safe{Wallet} front-end showed legitimate data while hardware wallets signed a malicious transferOwnership call; open user approvals were also drained across Arbitrum, BSC, Ethereum and Base.
DetailsMalware compromised at least three developers' devices so the Safe{Wallet} front-end showed legitimate data while hardware wallets signed a malicious transferOwnership call; open user approvals were also drained across Arbitrum, BSC, Ethereum and Base.
Outcome: Remediation proceeded with US law enforcement and ZeroShadow; multisigs were tightened to 4-of-7 with a minimum 72-hour timelock on upgrades and ownership transfers, and a full Aave V2 Lending Suite redeployment was planned.
Source16 Oct 2024
The same October 2024 compromise hit the isolated RIZ vaults deployed via rizYearnV3VaultFactory and yRizStrategy.
DetailsThe same October 2024 compromise hit the isolated RIZ vaults deployed via rizYearnV3VaultFactory and yRizStrategy.
Outcome: rizWETH on Arbitrum lost 99.992 WETH declared irrecoverable; rizUSDC on Arbitrum was unpaused on 27 November 2024 with 64,229.73 USDC withdrawn, and rizUSDT on BNB saw near-full recovery.
Source1 Jun 2026
The DAO began an orderly wind-down after eighteen months of failing to recover exploited funds, secure financing or restore growth; active development ceased immediately.
DetailsThe DAO began an orderly wind-down after eighteen months of failing to recover exploited funds, secure financing or restore growth; active development ceased immediately.
Outcome: Borrow was disabled with caps set to 1 across all Core and RIZv1 markets, RDNT emissions were discontinued, treasury use was restricted to essential operations, and the protocol stays open for withdrawals, repayments and position management.
SourceEvent-type chips are categorised by event type against the risk taxonomy (a documented presentation mapping, not a dataset assessment). Amounts are the dataset's published figures; missing values were never published.
