Credit · SYRUP
Maple Finance runs onchain lending pools to vetted borrowers (institutions, funds and businesses), closer to a blockchain-based credit marketplace than open overcollateralized DeFi lending.
Onchain institutional / private credit.
SYRUP price
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Typed risks scored by severity, likelihood and impact, with the incident record behind them.
40
severity-weighted points across 15 typed risks · 1 critical
assessed Feb 2026Market
9· 3 risks
Technological
6· 3 risks
Counterparty
14· 5 risks · 1 critical
Governance
6· 2 risks
Regulatory
5· 2 risks
Every score is recomputed at render time from the typed risks below; nothing is hand-assigned. Each risk contributes its severity weight (critical 4 · high 3 · medium 2 · low 1) to its category; the headline number is the sum across all categories. Bars scale to this entity's highest category score. Scores are not comparable across tags because a permissionless-market protocol concentrates technological risk while an institutional-credit protocol concentrates counterparty and regulatory risk, and a single league table would misrepresent both.
Market 3 × → 9
Technological 3 × → 6
Counterparty 5 × → 14
Governance 2 × → 6
Regulatory 2 × → 5
Maple is the most credit heavy protocol in this set, and its risk is fundamentally about who is borrowing rather than about code. It has never suffered a smart contract exploit, but it has suffered real credit losses: lenders took a 3.2% haircut on the Babel liquidation in July 2022 and a roughly 36 million USD default from Orthogonal Trading in December 2022, both traceable to a borrower misstating its position. Maple's answer since then has been to move underwriting in house, require overcollateralisation, and lean on regulated custodians and a Reg D exemption to serve institutional and accredited money, which is a genuine improvement but shifts the exposure rather than removing it. What remains is a concentrated book, more than three quarters of collateral in BTC and XRP, a single externally owned Pool Delegate key, an impairment switch that can cut depositor value without a vote, and secondary liquidity too thin to absorb a large exit. Depositors should treat syrupUSDC as a credit fund with a token wrapper, not as a money market position.
Market3
Technological3
Counterparty5
Governance2
Regulatory2
4 documented incidents · 10 Jul 2022 to Mar 2023 to Sep 2023 · how the protocol behaved under stress, with sources.
10 Jul 2022
A 10 million USDC loan to Babel Finance in the Orthogonal Trading pool on Maple was liquidated. A Notice of Default had been issued on 1 July 2022 for violating a representation in the Master Loan Agreement, and the smart contracts recognised default on 9 July.
DetailsA 10 million USDC loan to Babel Finance in the Orthogonal Trading pool on Maple was liquidated. A Notice of Default had been issued on 1 July 2022 for violating a representation in the Master Loan Agreement, and the smart contracts recognised default on 9 July.
Outcome: Pool Cover including an extra 1 million USD deposited on the day was liquidated, but liquidation value is capped at a third of the USDC in the Balancer pool. The remaining 7,852,146 USD was absorbed evenly by lenders in a pool of 244,000,237.40 USD, a 3.2% loss to all lenders.
Source30 Nov 2022
Auros Global missed the principal payment on a 2,400 wETH loan worth about 3 million USD from an M11 Credit pool, citing a short term liquidity issue caused by the FTX insolvency. Total Auros exposure to the M11 wETH pool was 8,400 wETH, about 10.7 million USD, plus a 7.5 million USDC loan from a second M11 pool.
DetailsAuros Global missed the principal payment on a 2,400 wETH loan worth about 3 million USD from an M11 Credit pool, citing a short term liquidity issue caused by the FTX insolvency. Total Auros exposure to the M11 wETH pool was 8,400 wETH, about 10.7 million USD, plus a 7.5 million USDC loan from a second M11 pool.
Outcome: Restructuring rather than write off. M11 Credit recovered an initial 60% in February 2023 and secured full repayment of 7.5 million USDC and 8,400 wETH including interest on 8 November 2023.
Source5 Dec 2022
Orthogonal Trading defaulted on about 36 million USD of loans on Maple, made up of about 31 million USDC across four loans plus roughly 5 million USD in wETH. Maple stated Orthogonal had been operating while effectively insolvent and had misrepresented its financial position, with the losses tied to funds trapped on FTX.
DetailsOrthogonal Trading defaulted on about 36 million USD of loans on Maple, made up of about 31 million USDC across four loans plus roughly 5 million USD in wETH. Maple stated Orthogonal had been operating while effectively insolvent and had misrepresented its financial position, with the losses tied to funds trapped on FTX.
Outcome: Maple severed ties with Orthogonal, M11 Credit issued the default notice, and the loss fell on lenders in the affected pools.
SourceMar 2023 to Sep 2023
Following the 2022 defaults, Maple wound down its undercollateralised lending model. Deposits that had approached 1 billion USD in May 2022 fell to 21 million USD of TVL in March 2023.
DetailsFollowing the 2022 defaults, Maple wound down its undercollateralised lending model. Deposits that had approached 1 billion USD in May 2022 fell to 21 million USD of TVL in March 2023.
Outcome: All pools launched in 2023 were overcollateralised and only about 10% of outstanding loans remained undercollateralised by September 2023. Maple brought underwriting in house under Maple Direct.
SourceEvent-type chips are categorised by event type against the risk taxonomy (a documented presentation mapping, not a dataset assessment). Amounts are the dataset's published figures; missing values were never published.
