Credit · Leveraged Yield · FLUID
Fluid (formerly Instadapp) combines lending, vaults and DEX liquidity through a shared liquidity layer, so the same capital can support lending and trading.
Capital-efficient lending + DEX hybrid on a shared liquidity layer.
FLUID price
$1.14
-0.2% 24h
Latest data · 15 min delay
Typed risks scored by severity, likelihood and impact, with the incident record behind them.
42
severity-weighted points across 15 typed risks · 2 critical
assessed Jul 2026Market
18· 6 risks · 1 critical
Technological
9· 4 risks
Counterparty
9· 3 risks · 1 critical
Governance
6· 2 risks
Regulatory
No rowsNo Regulatory risk rows in the dataset: a recorded finding (no fetchable regulatory exposure source), not missing data.
Every score is recomputed at render time from the typed risks below; nothing is hand-assigned. Each risk contributes its severity weight (critical 4 · high 3 · medium 2 · low 1) to its category; the headline number is the sum across all categories. Bars scale to this entity's highest category score. Scores are not comparable across tags because a permissionless-market protocol concentrates technological risk while an institutional-credit protocol concentrates counterparty and regulatory risk, and a single league table would misrepresent both.
Market 6 × → 18
Technological 4 × → 9
Counterparty 3 × → 9
Governance 2 × → 6
Fluid is the most technically sophisticated protocol in this set and also the one with the most recent damage. Its shared Liquidity Layer and tick-based liquidation engine allow 80% to 95% LTVs with penalties as low as 0.1%, which is genuinely best in class, and Yearn's curation team scored it 1.4 out of 5.0, "Minimal Risk". The problem is not the engine, it is what gets plugged into it: Fluid repeatedly ends up holding almost the entire float of a third-party yield-bearing wrapper inside 6x loops, so an issuer failure at Resolv in March 2026 turned into $10m to $21m of Fluid bad debt and a 30% TVL fall in a day. Bad debt was made whole, but by discretionary loans and a team multisig drawing a credit line before the governance vote, which is a governance answer rather than a structural one, and the one-day timelock leaves lenders little room to act on such decisions. Today's book still shows top-five collateral at 69% and several markets above 90% , so the same shape is in place, and the Jupiter Lend and Venus deployments extend that shape to venues Fluid does not run.
Market6
Technological4
Counterparty3
Governance2
5 documented incidents · 22 Mar 2026 to 22 to 23 Mar 2026 · how the protocol behaved under stress, with sources.
22 Mar 2026
A compromised Resolv Labs AWS KMS SERVICE_ROLE key was used to mint roughly 80m unbacked USR for about $200,000 of USDC; USR fell from $1.00 to $0.0025 on Curve before recovering to roughly $0.85.
DetailsA compromised Resolv Labs AWS KMS SERVICE_ROLE key was used to mint roughly 80m unbacked USR for about $200,000 of USDC; USR fell from $1.00 to $0.0025 on Curve before recovering to roughly $0.85.
Outcome: USR recovered to ~$0.85. Fluid paused affected markets within about 30 minutes.
Source22 Mar 2026
Fluid held roughly $100m of USR exposure, with about 98% of wstUSR supply looped inside Fluid at up to 6x leverage, so the USR collapse left the protocol with bad debt.
DetailsFluid held roughly $100m of USR exposure, with about 98% of wstUSR supply looped inside Fluid at up to 6x leverage, so the USR collapse left the protocol with bad debt.
Outcome: Covered 100% by discretionary off-balance-sheet loans from Lom Lomashuk / Cyber Fund, "weremeow" and the Fluid core team. About $70m of USR-related debt was repaid by 25 March 2026. fToken exchange rates stayed monotonically increasing and Ethereum lenders took no loss.
Source18 Apr 2026
Roughly 116,500 rsETH, about 18% of supply, was drained through a LayerZero cross-chain messaging exploit at Kelp DAO.
DetailsRoughly 116,500 rsETH, about 18% of supply, was drained through a LayerZero cross-chain messaging exploit at Kelp DAO.
Outcome: Fluid froze rsETH markets within hours alongside Aave, SparkLend and Upshift. No bad debt at Fluid. TVL fell from $1.04b to $861m, a 17.5% drop over two days.
Source1 Jun 2026
The Ethereum reward distribution system was exploited using compromised operational keys rather than a contract vulnerability; the attacker swapped proceeds to ETH and laundered through Tornado Cash.
DetailsThe Ethereum reward distribution system was exploited using compromised operational keys rather than a contract vulnerability; the attacker swapped proceeds to ETH and laundered through Tornado Cash.
Outcome: Core lending and trading were unaffected.
Source22 to 23 Mar 2026
TVL fell from $1.25b to $873m, a 30.3% drop in 24 hours, as looped USR positions unwound and lenders withdrew.
DetailsTVL fell from $1.25b to $873m, a 30.3% drop in 24 hours, as looped USR positions unwound and lenders withdrew.
Outcome: Markets stabilised; a $19.3m settlement was agreed on 12 May 2026, split roughly Resolv $9.7m, Fluid governance treasury $8.2m and Fluid team $1.5m from future revenue.
SourceEvent-type chips are categorised by event type against the risk taxonomy (a documented presentation mapping, not a dataset assessment). Amounts are the dataset's published figures; missing values were never published.
