Liquidity · Pools · CRV
Curve's stableswap invariant is optimized for trades between like-pegged assets (stablecoins, LSTs). It pioneered vote-escrow tokenomics where governance power is bought with locked CRV (veCRV).
Stableswap AMM optimized for like-pegged assets.
CRV price
$0.3609
+0.2% 24h
Latest data · 15 min delay
Curve contracts are written in Vyper. The July 30 2023 exploit showed that a bug in the Vyper compiler itself (versions 0.2.15/0.2.16/0.3.0) can silently break Curve's non-reentrant locks, allowing reentrancy drains of multiple pools even when the Curve source code appears correct. Compiler and low-level implementation risk is therefore a first-order concern.
Curve v2 (CryptoSwap/Tricrypto) and crvUSD rely on internal EMA price oracles and aggregated stablecoin prices. Auditors (e.g. ChainSecurity) flagged that flash-loan-driven manipulation of pool totalSupply could distort the crvUSD price aggregator, so mispriced or manipulable oracle inputs can lead to bad mints or unfair liquidations.
crvUSD is only as sound as its collateral and the LLAMMA soft-liquidation engine. In fast, gapping markets soft-liquidation may fail to fully de-risk positions, leaving undercollateralized debt and creating depeg pressure on crvUSD.
Voting power concentrates in veCRV, and the emissions gauge system spawned a 'bribe economy' (the Curve Wars). Large veCRV holders and vote-buying markets can steer CRV emissions toward their own pools, and heavy founder/insider CRV holdings historically concentrated influence and market risk.
CRV was widely used as loan collateral across DeFi (Aave, Fraxlend, Inverse, UwU, LlamaLend). The founder's large CRV-backed borrowing meant a CRV price drop threatened cascading liquidations across multiple protocols, and the June 2024 liquidation left real bad debt in lending markets - illustrating cross-protocol contagion risk tied to CRV.
