Curve Finance
Liquidity · Pools · CRV
Curve's stableswap invariant is optimized for trades between like-pegged assets (stablecoins, LSTs). It pioneered vote-escrow tokenomics where governance power is bought with locked CRV (veCRV).
Stableswap AMM optimized for like-pegged assets.
CRV price
$0.2062
+0.6% 24h
Latest data · 15 min delay
Risks identified
- Smart Contract
Curve contracts are written in Vyper. The July 30 2023 exploit showed that a bug in the Vyper compiler itself (versions 0.2.15/0.2.16/0.3.0) can silently break Curve's non-reentrant locks, allowing reentrancy drains of multiple pools even when the Curve source code appears correct. Compiler and low-level implementation risk is therefore a first-order concern.
- Oracle
Curve v2 (CryptoSwap/Tricrypto) and crvUSD rely on internal EMA price oracles and aggregated stablecoin prices. Auditors (e.g. ChainSecurity) flagged that flash-loan-driven manipulation of pool totalSupply could distort the crvUSD price aggregator, so mispriced or manipulable oracle inputs can lead to bad mints or unfair liquidations.
- Reserve / Depeg
crvUSD is only as sound as its collateral and the LLAMMA soft-liquidation engine. In fast, gapping markets soft-liquidation may fail to fully de-risk positions, leaving undercollateralized debt and creating depeg pressure on crvUSD.
- Governance
Voting power concentrates in veCRV, and the emissions gauge system spawned a 'bribe economy' (the Curve Wars). Large veCRV holders and vote-buying markets can steer CRV emissions toward their own pools, and heavy founder/insider CRV holdings historically concentrated influence and market risk.
- Systemic
CRV was widely used as loan collateral across DeFi (Aave, Fraxlend, Inverse, UwU, LlamaLend). The founder's large CRV-backed borrowing meant a CRV price drop threatened cascading liquidations across multiple protocols, and the June 2024 liquidation left real bad debt in lending markets - illustrating cross-protocol contagion risk tied to CRV.